How 'back' is liberal democracy really?

Recently there has been much crowing/bemoaning, depending on the writer’s political inclinations, about liberal democracy’s 2022 fightback against and possible vanquishing of the forces which have been assailing it, since 2016 especially. Janan Ganesh writes ‘This was the year liberal democracy fought back’ spelling out the thesis: the end of Boris, Brexit dead ‘if not as a fact of life then as a project that inspires’, Trump-backed candidates performing poorly in the US midterms, and Putin’s floundering in Ukraine together with Xi’s incoherent zero-Covid policy puncturing the aura of competence that surrounded authoritarian regimes. Richard Hanania writes ‘The Year of Fukuyama’, focusing on the same Chinese and Russian failings compared to the stability of the US system, where contrary to some liberal fears neither challenges from the right (January 6th) or the left (wokeness) have really proved a significant threat to the liberal core of democratic government or the market economy. Andrew Sullivan writes ‘The Normie Center Strikes Back’, focusing on how MAGA extremism underperformed at the US midterms due to being seen as too dangerous by voters, and echoing Ganesh’s thoughts on Britain, Russia and China.

Three flavours of challenge to liberal democracy

There have been three broad categories of challengers to liberalism in recent years. One is the right wing populist upsurge in Western countries primarily stimulated by immigration-driven demographic change, and to a lesser extent by the continued march of wokeness into mainstream culture (see Eric Kaufmann’s Whiteshift). Brexit, Trump, and the rise of similar movements in continental Europe such as the RN in France, the Sweden Democrats, or the Brothers of Italy are examples of this.

The second category is the rise of democratic governments in non-Western or quasi-Western countries which are to some extent illiberal, generally in that they promote a strong conservative national culture that necessarily clashes with the universalist aspects of liberalism, and/or violate to some extent the pillars of liberal governance like an independent judiciary or free press. The governments of Poland, Hungary, Israel, Turkey, India, or Bolsonaro’s erstwhile Brazil are examples here. These governments are often painted as ‘undemocratic’ by liberals (when what they really mean is ‘not liberal enough for my tastes’; they are at worst illiberal democracies.

The final category is authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian regimes in non-Western countries which espouse an explicitly oppositional model from the liberal West, e.g. China, Iran, North Korea, Russia and the gulf states. Some of these countries have seemed (until 2022 at least) to provide a superior model in areas such as growing the economy (China and the gulf states), military interventions abroad (Russia in Syria), and fighting Covid (China in 2020).

The Western right-wing populist surge

Looking at the first, Western type of challenger, it has certainly abated somewhat in America (in that Trump did not win a second term and Trump-backed republicans did not do particularly well in the November 2022 midterms), and in Britain (in that a right-wing populist style Brexit is finished as a political project).

On the other hand it is rising in France, with Le Pen’s right-wing populist National Rally party achieving 41% of the vote in the second round of the 2022 presidential election, their highest vote share ever (compared with 34% in 2017, not making the second round in 2012 or 2007, and 18% under Le Pen the elder in their breakthrough election in 2002). In his aforementioned article, Ganesh emphasises that Macron was the first president to win reelection since 2002, and that he ‘retired Marine Le Pen in the process’. However neither of these two facts are germane to the wider trend, Macron has been historically unpopular for years and was only saved in 2022 because, for now, Le Pen is even more unpopular, and Le Pen’s retirement from party leader has made way for her ‘photogenic 27-year-old’ rising-star protege while she continues to lead the party’s group of MPs, hardly a symbol of her party’s downfall. It is also rising in Italy, with the Brothers of Italy becoming for the first time the largest party in the 2022 general election, and in Sweden, with the Sweden Democrats also making a historic breakthrough in 2022 to become the second largest party in the Riksdag.

Have the drivers of this upsurge abated? The main one, immigration-led demographic change, has not, and will not abate any time soon. Even if immigration stops tomorrow, much of the demographic change over the next few decades is baked in by the younger age profile of the migrant-descended population. However there are signs that concern about immigration is dropping in the US and UK (but not elsewhere in Europe). In the British case though, it is too soon to tell whether the decline in concern about immigration since Brexit is the start of a new trend or simply because most people who are likely to be concerned about immigration have not yet realised that Brexit has not led to any decrease in it. Younger generations in Britain are, on average, more positive about immigration, so all other things being equal we should expect overall attitudes here to grow more positive over time. But in France, younger generations are more likely to support the RN than average, indicating the opposite.

Therefore the issue is likely to remain an important source of conflict in Western politics for some time, though it is likely, of course, to vary by country. There is also the other side to consider, the ability of liberalism to counter the populist right challenge. As wokeness becomes more dominant in public life, this has the effect of further shaming and repressing right-wing populist views. But this also leads to backlash, with Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter (a great defeat for the liberal PMC) supposedly being stimulated by its censorship of a satirical article about trans Biden health official Rachel Levine.

Non or quasi-Western illiberal democracy

The driver behind the rise of non or quasi-Western illiberal democracies is most commonly a relative increase in power of a conservative ‘nationally-minded’ element of society versus the previously dominant, more internationalist/liberal elite. The strong global economic growth since the 1990s which has spread wealth outside traditional centres of economic strength has been important here. For example, Erdogan’s base is the Anatolian heartland which has gained strength versus the traditional secular urban elite concentrated in Istanbul. The situation in India is similar, long ruled by the secular, Westernised, and civic nationalist Congress Party elites, Modi’s BJP appeals to a rising segment of the population with a much more Hindu nationalist vision of the country. Modi himself, with his imperfect English and lifelong background in Hindu-nationalist politics, contrasting with his half-Italian, internationally educated opponent Rahul Gandhi, is an exemplar here. Then there is the Law and Justice party in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, which symbolise a reassertion of national identity and conservative values after the discombobulating post-communist period dominated by liberals, who were often ex-communists (see Ryszard Legutko’s Demon in Democracy).

There is little sign that these illiberal democracies are on the decline. Law and Justice and Fidesz continue to be successful electorally, as does the AKP in Turkey, despite Erdogan’s bizarre economic policies. Modi remains extremely popular, while Israel becomes more right-wing with every election. Contra Sullivan, Bolsonaro’s election loss is the exception, not the rule. These new political realities are the reflection of the long term ‘rise of the rest’, and more precisely, the rise of new national, not international, forces of power and wealth within the rest, a trend that is not going to be reversed.

Authoritarian/quasi authoritarian regimes

Authoritarianism has definitely had a bad year. The Russian military’s underperformance in Ukraine has destroyed the aura of competence that had grown up around it especially since its successful intervention in Syria. One classic problem of authoritarianism seems likely to have contributed strongly, the lack of accountability for leaders, which fosters corruption, and the lack of an honest feedback loop, which gives leaders illusions about the true situation on the ground. China’s Covid overreaction exemplifies another weakness, that of concentrating too much power in one leader, and the consequent difficulties with changing course once a policy associated with them (Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy in this case) no longer makes sense. In a democratic system, it is obviously much easier to remove leaders who have embarked on highly unpopular policies, as Truss’s recent defenestration shows. The recent protests in Iran against restrictions on women’s freedom exemplify another problem with authoritarianism, the difficulties of trying to combine some aspects of a free, modern society (educating women to a high level, as Iran does) with traditional, freedom-restricting morality.

Concurrent with the stumbles of authoritarian countries, the West has recently shown the ability to take purposeful and coordinated action against its rivals. The coalition against Russia in support of Ukraine has held up better than most suspected, and there are signs in the Biden administration’s chip sanctions and in similar efforts to restrict its influence in the EV supply chain, that serious efforts are being made to counter China too.

All other things being equal though, the rise of the rest is not stopping, even if it slows, so we should expect a continual chipping away of the West’s power, and hence most likely that of liberalism too. The key question is around the ability of the authoritarian regimes to adapt without crumbling; reform being a dangerous process for them. There are some signs in recent weeks that they may be able to, with China finally ending zero-Covid in response to protests, and early reports that Iran may be abolishing the morality police. If, despite their sluggishness in 2022, they are able to adapt to challenges, then this year of apparent Western advantage may be seen as a blip.

Conclusion

The commentators hailing the return of liberalism then, are focusing on events in the English-speaking world, on Russia’s failures in Ukraine, and on China’s Covid policy, without seeing the wider picture. The trend is going the other way in continental Europe, and in the broad swathe of illiberal democracies around the world, which seem to have found a successful model of a democratic system without the liberal overreach which alienates a large proportion of the population. Taking a global view then, the broader trend is unchanged.